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“Whimsies and Crochets”:
Pragmatism, Poetry, and Literary
Criticism’s Founding Gesture 
Kristen Case
1 The premise of this essay is  that one of the fundamental contributions of Jamesian
thought to early-twentieth-century culture was the idea of  truth as  a  participatory
process involving a range of both human and nonhuman actors. Lately the idea of truth
as a “construction” has proven problematic,  particularly in a moment when, in the
United States, we find ourselves confronted with the specter of “alternative facts” and
“fake  news”—and so  I  wish  to  revisit  this  key  Jamesian  idea,  but  not  through the
familiar figure of construction—which seems inevitably to be taken up (as both Bruno
Latour  and  Isabelle  Stengers  have  pointed  out)  with  a  “merely”  attached,  as  in
“scientific laws are merely constructions,”—and which also lamentably suggests a fixed
and static edifice, rather than a Jamesian flux.1 So rather than construction I want to
talk about participation, which etymologically means “to take our share of.” The part in
participation reminds us that we aren’t responsible for the whole thing, but we are
responsible  for  our  share.  Participation,  for  James,  was  at  once  epistemological  and
ethical. The epistemological claim, as articulated “Pragmatism and Humanism,” is that
“in our cognitive as well as in our active lives we are creative. We add both to the
subject and to the predicate parts of reality” (599). The ethical corollary to this claim is
nicely illustrated by the following passage from Pragmatism, in which James describes
a world growing not integrally but piecemeal by the contributions of its several
parts.  Take the hypothesis seriously and as a live one. Suppose that the world’s
author put the case to you before creation, saying: “I am going to make a world not
certain to be saved, a world the perfection of which shall be conditional merely, the
condition being that each several agent does its own ‘level best.’  I  offer you the
chance of taking part in such a world. Its safety, you see, is unwarranted. It is a real
adventure, with real danger, yet it may win through. It is a social scheme of co-
operative work genuinely to be done. Will you join the procession? Will you trust
yourself  and trust  the other agents enough to face the risk?” Should you in all
seriousness, if participation in such a world were proposed to you, feel bound to
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reject it as not safe enough? Would you say that, rather than be part and parcel of
so fundamentally pluralistic and irrational a universe, you preferred to relapse into
the slumber of nonentity from which you had been momentarily aroused by the
tempter’s voice? (112)
2 It is significant that for James the only alternative to participation is “nonentity.” Non-
participation is  not  an  option  if  one  is  to  remain  on  the  side  of  being.  We  ought,
therefore, to own up to and embrace our participation in the world, to willingly do our
share of its co-operative work.
3 My argument in this essay has two parts. The first, already well-established by Joan
Richardson, Steven Meyer, and others, is that in the early decades of the twentieth
century the Jamesian epistemology and ethos of  participation had a transformative
effect on U.S. poetry—my example here will be the poetry of George Oppen, largely
because this gives me a good excuse to examine the recently discovered, pre-Discrete
Series poems published in pamphlet form by New Directions in 2018, but I suspect I
could have chosen almost any major US poet of this period to make this point.2 
4 The second part of the argument is  that in these same decades,  the then-emergent
profession of literary criticism refused to absorb the participatory ethos, even as other
disciplines, perhaps most notably education and anthropology, were being transformed
by  it.  My  principle  example  here  will  be  I.A.  Richards,  whose  Principles  of  Literary
Criticism I’ll consider as a founding document for the discipline. I’ll conclude with some
thoughts  about  what  the  adoption  of  a participatory  approach  might  look  like  in
literary critical studies, with special attention to the transactional model of reading
theorized by Louise Rosenblatt beginning in the late 1930s.3
 
1. Oppen, Richards/Participation, Distance
5 There is much to be said about the newly discovered “21 Poems” of George Oppen,
which  predate  what  had  previously  been  considered  his  earliest  published  work,
Discrete Series—but for the purposes of this talk I will limit myself to a brief discussion of
the first poem, which seems to me to speak in every way, on every level, of the fact of
our participation. 
Round muscles in the damp womb 
Move. Child (folded, articulated: knees bent, back rounded) 
Fills the dark wholly. Knee jerks shortly, entirely silent. 
Surges of blood in the smaller veins beat perhaps more sharply. 
     Begins— 
(Hand jumps against the soft wall) — 
But for the bound darkness, 
Back, back sinking! The dark pressure, slowly absolute. 
Lurches (soundless). Forced muscle to muscle 
Pressed blind ungroping, parting the live personal flesh. 
That is it! (The woman screaming) 
Round baby-head to the battered light 
     (O God she) 
(But dawned in the veins unmoved and unremarkably warm) 
New light blunts on the body, shatters in vacant eyes. Shot thru 
     already 
This stuff with fragile passages. Light has delicate forceps. 
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The world leaps against the wall, 
Spread shapes, colours dissolving. This has been standing 
How long, in the waiting light, visible? 
     Born! Pulses accurately, 
     Surges down soft wrists. 
Begins unhesitating. (Of all we three only) Damp throat beneath, firm with muscles.
To 
     which 
Born? (No return. The woman 
Again the woman. The path sealed, no dark pool of comfort.) 
The woman returns. Here dropped the world. 
But the warm breasts, drawing from inward, 
(The round muscles, the ribbed cavern, untaut, unsuspended 
Life irrevocably bright. But the warm breasts, outreached, 
Have followed him. (11)
6 This remarkable description of childbirth, written around 1929, takes up a perspective
that shifts between observer and participant. In the opening lines, Oppen adopts the
Dickinsonian strategy of a logically impossible perspective: an observer inside the damp
womb who is  not the child,  but who sees that  the child “fills  the dark wholly.” Of
course, such an image might also be arrived at from a position outside the womb from
the child’s back and knees articulated against the mother’s body, but the slippage here
between  what  is  inferred  and  what  is  seen dramatizes  the  fluidity  of  all  such
movements, the way perception participates in the world extending our vision from the
seen to the unseen. In the poem’s opening lines, Oppen brings the question of inside
and outside to the fore, yoking the question of the poem’s perspective to the event it
describes, parturition, or the act of giving birth. 
7 Here I’d like to think about the coincidence of the sound-similarity of parturition and
participation. These words have different etymologies: parturition means labor, coming
from the Latin verb meaning “to bring forth” while participate comes from a different
Latin  verb  meaning “to  take  part.”  I  am struck,  however,  by  the  way  these  words
together  are  suggestive  of  James’s  description  of  reality  as  “social  scheme  of  co-
operative work genuinely to be done.”
8 In his  introduction to Oppen’s  Collected Poems,  Michael  Davidson describes the “odd
merging  of  American  pragmatism  and  European  existentialism  in  Oppen’s  poetry,”
noting that “in both systems, knowledge is a relationship between rather than of things,
a negotiation rather than an appropriation.” Davidson describes the way this relational
or participatory ethos works both in the poems of Discrete Series and in the later Of Being
Numerous, noting that Oppen “places his faith in parts of speech and speech acts rather
than images because it is only in its reduced, functional state that language may reveal
its complicity in the production (rather than refection) of reality” (xxxi-ii). The idea of
the mind’s participation in the world is reflected everywhere in Oppen’s writing, and
there  is  good reason to  suspect  that  Jamesian  pragmatism is  an  important  part  of
Oppen’s American inheritance.4 
9 In the opening poem of the series we see this participatory ethos playing itself out not
only on the level of language but also on the level of life itself—one is tempted to say,
on the level on ontology. Language suggests not only the ways in which we participate
in  what  we  know,  but  also  the  fact  that  our  very  being  is  a  product  of  labor,  the
cooperative labor between the body of the mother and the body of the child, though
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such  labor  is  hidden  from  view  in  order  to  maintain  our  forgetfulness  of  our
dependence  on  others.  Our  essential  contingency  goes  hand-in-hand  with  our
participation  in  the  world:  like  everything  else  we  are  brought  into  being  via  the
agency of others. Oppen’s poem is a vivid evocation of the fact that we do not stand
aloof above the world; we are in it. We are it. 
10 Oppen read both Jameses, though his debt to Henry James is more clearly established,
and  we  can  see  some  evidence  both  of  his  awareness  of  pragmatism  and  of  the
pragmatist tendencies of his own thought in the following entry from the Daybooks,
likely written between 1962 and 1965:
Does philosophy burden itself unnecessarily with the terms ‘mind’ and ‘subject’? Is
it not possible simply to say that the world contains, among other things, living
organisms? The problem of knowledge would therefore reduce to psychological or
physiological problems. It would result, I suppose, in a pragmatist solution, since it
is clear that reason cannot judge its own reasonableness except by its results in
action. (88)
11 A few lines down from this passage, Oppen writes: “I DO NOT MEAN TO PRESCRIBE AN
OPINION OR AN IDEA, BUT TO RECORD THE EXPERIENCE OF THINKING IT” (88). This
sentence, crossed out text included, rather neatly summarizes for me the pragmatist
inheritance in American poetry in the first half of the twentieth century. For the poets
who absorbed it, this inheritance transformed the descriptive imagist impulse into the
participatory objectivist one, an impulse that extended beyond the objectivist movement
into modernism more generally: for Wallace Stevens, for example, modern poetry will
come to be defined as “the poem of the mind in the act of finding /What will suffice”
(218). 
12 By way of contrast, I’d like to turn now to a passage of a text from the same period, I.A.
Richards’s Principles of Literary Criticism, first published in 1926. Richards’s text set out
to be, and indeed became, a kind of rule book for the discipline of literary criticism as it
was emerging in the early twentieth century, and in his text we can see evidence of a
sort of founding gesture. At the same time that poetry in the U.S. was embracing a
pragmatist ethos of participation, literary criticism was creating itself as a discipline in
part by forbidding this ethos, and adopting instead a particularly rigid separation of
critical subject and literary object. Here is Richards, describing the critical practices
that he means to supplant:
A few conjectures, a supply of admonitions, many acute isolated observations, some
brilliant  guesses,  much  oratory  and  applied  poetry,  inexhaustible  confusion,  a
sufficiency  of  dogma,  no  small  stock  of  prejudices,  whimsies,  and  crochets,  a
profusion  of  mysticism,  a  little  genuine  speculation,  sundry  stray  inspirations,
pregnant  hints  and  random  apercus;  of  such  as  these  it  may  be  said  without
exaggeration, is extant critical theory composed. (2) 
13 Of particular interest  to me is  the phrase “applied poetry” which moves us from a
description of symptoms to a diagnosis: the underlying problem with “extant critical
theory,”  the  passage  suggests,  is  a  failure  to  distinguish  literary  criticism  from
literature  itself,  an  improper  assimilation of  the  subject  by  its  object.  This  kind of
boundary policing, I want to argue—perhaps most clearly embodied a couple of decades
later in Wimsatt and Beardsley’s “affective fallacy”—was the move around which the
literary  critical  culture  we  still  inhabit  was  formed.  Though  we’ve  struggled  as  a
discipline to make up our collective minds about what literary criticism should do or
be,  we’ve  been  quite  clear  about  what  we  don’t wish  to  be:  whimsical,  nostalgic,
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sentimental, unrigorous. Nothing comes more naturally to the literary critic, nothing is
more enshrined in normal critical practice, than the establishment of one’s rigor by way
of one’s detachment.5
14 I  want  to  pay  particular  attention  here  to  the  gendered  character  of  Richards’s
language—especially “whimsies and crochets” and “pregnant hints”—for here we see
the psychic threat over which the protest of critical autonomy is erected again and
again:  assimilation,  being  literally  taken  in,  involves  a  giving  over  of  one’s  self,  a
forgoing of the illusion of autonomy. Insofar as integrity and independence are the
hallmarks of the model masculine subject, the messiness and entanglement that are the
epistemological  starting  point  for  the  Jamesian  participatory  ethos  seem  feminine,
weak, unprofessional, unrigorous.
15 I want to further suggest that it is in part the necessity of a degree of assimilation, of
being taken in, to critical work that makes Richards, and literary critical culture in his
wake, protest so anxiously against it. Literary criticism is writing defined by its relation
to  other  writing.  In  this  way  it  may  be  said  to  be  closer  to  its  subject  than  say,
anthropology or even art criticism. Its most basic practices require its practitioners to
become  absorbed  by,  to  enter  into,  another  writer’s  writing.  It  is  born  of  another
writer’s writing. The boundary between writing about literature and writing literature
(which is always also on some level about literature) is, practically speaking, a porous
one, “shot thru /already… with fragile passages.” At the level of actual practice, critical
writers are not “studying an object” so much as moving around in a sea of texts, their
own and those of others, thinking in and with these texts, taking in and being taken in
in turn.
16 But for the literary critics of the early twentieth century, eager to establish on the
notoriously  feminine  ground  of  literature  a  respectably  masculine  discipline,  the
participatory nature of literary critical practice had to be obscured. As Gerald Graff
details in Professing Literature, in the nineteenth century “the modern languages and
literatures were considered mere social accomplishments, they were looked upon as
feminine preoccupations. This explains why these subjects made earlier headway in the
female  academies  that  proliferated  in  the  middle  decades  of  the  century.”  This
perception of the study of literature as a feminine pastime rather than a serious (i.e.
masculine) undertaking helps explain the special appeal of professionalization for the
young discipline, which sought not only to shake of the taint of amateurism but also to
cleanse  itself  of  its  “reputation  for  effeminacy.”  Indeed,  Graff  notes,  “One  of  the
attractions of Germanic philology” for emerging literary scholarship in the U.S. was
“that as a hard science its manliness was not in question” (38). I want to suggest that
what began as a professional imperative rooted in and reinforcing class and gender
distinctions  has  become  mostly  a  matter  of  convention,  upheld  by  the  force  of
disciplinary inertia  and new varieties  of  professional  insecurity  that  urge,  however
radical a critic’s political or theoretical positions, extreme conservatism in her writerly
comportment.
17 What it might mean for literary critics to surrender our implicit claims of autonomy, to
confess  our  interestedness,  to  adopt  a  participatory  rather  than  a  distant  critical
stance? This question dovetails in significant ways with questions raised by Rita Felski
in The Limits of Critique, by Bruno Latour in “Why Has Critique Run out of Steam?,” and
by Eve Sedgwick in “Paranoid Reading, Reparative Reading.” Taking a cue from Oppen’s
Daybooks entry, I want to suggest that a participatory ethos in literary criticism might
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involve  “RECORDING  THE  EXPERIENCE  OF  THINKING”  in  our  own  personal,  messy,
interested engagements with literature, taking that experience seriously, taking it as
the starting point  for  critical  writing,  or,  perhaps we might  better  say,  for  writing
about other writing.
18 The kind of practice I am describing here does not amount to a rejection of literary
criticism  as  conventionally  practiced,  even  as  practiced  by  the  likes  of  Richards,
Wimsatt,  and  Beardsley,  but  rather  the  explicit  acceptance  of  one  of  conventional
criticism’s own implicit values—the value of care—which is everywhere evident in, for
example, Richards’ reading of Eliot in the appendix of Principles of Literary Criticism.6 The
premise that,  as Richards has it,  “mixed modes of writing which enlist the reader’s
feeling as well as his thinking” are “dangerous to the modern consciousness,” and that
such participatory modes signal a suspect effeminacy, I want to suggest, subsists as the
ghostly  holdover  of  the  compensatory  fantasies  of  a  once-fragile  new  discipline,
derived  from  an  antiquated  epistemological  model  in  which  feelings  could  (and
according to Richards, must) be separated from knowledge (5). 
 
2. Interlude on Whimsies and Crochets
19 I was an undergraduate listening to a lecture by a famous professor. The course was
Modernist Literature, the text was Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse. The lecture was
about nostalgia, and the novel was held up against Ulysses as an example of bourgeois
sentimentality masquerading as experimental modernism. The appeal of the book was
an appeal to longing for a bygone Victorian past. It was in this sense a false modernism,
in contrast to the true modernism of Joyce. Ten minutes into the lecture, I took out my
notebook and,  rather  than listen,  began copying sentences I  had underlined in the
novel, which I had finished breathlessly, tearfully, a few hours before class. I remember
feeling hot: my face burning with something like anger but also with something like
embarrassment at my own response, which I could see from the outside as petulant,
childlike,  feminine.  Risking  this  perception  of  my  response—or  rather  risking
internalizing what I imagined this perception would have been had anyone been able to
perceive it—felt like an imperative. Writing out the quotations (which itself felt like a
sentimental, girlish, pseudo-intellectual thing to do) was an adrenaline-fueled response
to a threat. If I could have articulated what I was feeling it would have been that the
professor was shaming me for loving this book, shaming all of us who loved it, and I
was using the book itself, its own language, as a way to shore up my love, as a way of
inwardly insisting on love as a valid response.
20 In  doing this,  I  saw my image of  myself  merge with an image from television and
movies, a girl in high school or middle school doodling hearts in her notebook, not
paying attention. It is always a girl doing this, dreaming of love, making something
decorative, failing to be serious.
21 In this encounter, several things happened: I erected a boundary between myself and
the professor. I also worked to deepen my attention to Woolf. Transcribing is a way of
getting to know a sentence slowly, word by word, with attention to order and rhythm.
As I lost myself in this attention, the professor’s words became noise and Woolf’s words
became hyper-present: on the page of the book, on the page of the notebook, a complex
transfer of mind to hand to other mind, other hand, across time.
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22 My favorite passage of “Self-Reliance” is the one in which Emerson dissolves the self he
has spent the previous pages telling us to rely on, concluding that what we must really
rely on—something he approximates with the phrase “the good”—is perfectly ineffable.
“When good is near you, when you have life in yourself,  it  is not by any known or
accustomed way; you shall not discern the foot-prints of any other; you shall not see
the face of man; you shall not hear any name;— the way, the thought, the good, shall be
wholly strange and new.” In this crisis moment, the attempt to articulate the essay’s
“highest truth” which “probably never can be spoken,” Emerson returns to the essay’s
title: “Why, then, do we prate of self-reliance?” (252)
23 Self-reliance at its deepest point turns out to be something like its opposite, an utter
openness or readiness to obey something that is not only not the self, it is not even
recognizable  to  the  self.  This  moment  risks  incoherence  and  self-contradiction.  It
especially risks, in not only explaining but enacting the complexities of this boundary
moment, being called “whimsical.”
24 In the lecture I, like Emerson, was both closing down and opening up at the same time
in  a  complicated  moment  of  boundary  adjustment.  Both  choices  were  instinctual,
having  to  do  with  survival.  The  professor’s  lecture  seemed  intended  not  only  to
“demystify”  the  text  but  also  to  cut  off  my  access  to  a  mode  of  reception  that  I
instinctively  valued  as  helpful  and  salutary.  It  seems  a  significant  feature  of  this
experience that it felt both like a choice and like a failure. In refusing to disavow my
love for the text, I felt myself to be failing at something (critical distance, clear-eyed
intellect, rigor).
25 As I worked I felt these criteria for success begin to slip away. I was making something
in my notebook. It had nothing to do with success. I was making it slowly, with care.
The small movements were repetitive and absorbing. It grew one line at a time, until I
was no longer little an adolescent girl but rather like an old woman knitting, or as
Richards would have it, crocheting. Finally, it was as if I weren’t there at all.
 
3. Reading as Transaction
26 Following Simone Weil, I want to suggest that given a framework of autonomous and
self-contained  subjectivity,  there  is  a  something  necessarily  humbling,  even
humiliating, in her particular, spiritual sense, about the experience of reading itself, a
sort  of  effacement  of  psychic  autonomy.  That  postures  of  critical  distance  are  so
alluring  in  part  because  they  compensate  for  or  provide  a  defense  against  that
humiliation. My speculation is that critical disavowal is a more sophisticated version of
the student’s recourse to hatred of the text as a mechanism for resisting reading the
text. “Something in our soul,” Weil writes,” has a far more violent repugnance for true
attention than the flesh has for bodily fatigue” (335).
27 Reading requires the reader to quiet her own thoughts, to direct her attention to the
sentence at hand in a variety of physical and cognitive ways. The retina scans the page,
triggering complex processes of instantaneous comparison of letter patterns to those
already stored in  the brain’s  mental  lexicon,  a  process  that  can be either  aided or
supplemented by spelling-to-sound conversion, which allows the reader to “voice” the
words silently. The more complex the sentence, the more processes will be brought to
bear. As cognitive neuroscientist Stanislas Dehaene notes,
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when our nervous system is confronted with ambiguity, its fundamental strategy is
to leave all possibilities open—something that is only feasible in a massively parallel
system where multiple interpretations can be simultaneously entertained. Thanks
to this open organization, the subsequent levels of analysis can contribute their
own pieces of evidence until  a globally satisfactory solution is reached. In some
cases, only the context in a sentence allows one to understand the meaning of a
word or even its pronunciation—think of a sentence like ‘the road winds through a
valley battered by fierce winds.’  In such cases, experiments show that all  of the
possible interpretations of a word are unconsciously activated, until  the context
restricts interpretation down to a single meaning. (x)
28 As Dehaene’s description illustrates, to read even a simple sentence demands not only
an  intense  investment  of  cognitive  attention  but  also a  pronounced  openness,
suspension in a state of indeterminacy. If we consider, now, an Emersonian or a Henry-
Jamesian sentence, which pulls the reader through such dense syntactical tangles that
she is  forced to loop back again and again,  connecting nouns to impossibly remote
verbs and vague pronouns to vaguer antecedents, aspects of the sense coming into view
while  others  are  fading  out,  the  whole  sentence  stretching  unknowably  ahead and
already forgotten behind like a road in a blizzard, we will have a clearer sense of the
psychic, as well as cerebral, work that reading an essay or a novel full of such sentences
involves.
29 Battered by fierce winds. The vulnerability suggested by Dehaene’s presumably random
example is suggestive. Attention of this kind is difficult and involves something that is,
for the secular literary critic, perhaps uncomfortably like faith. For the literary critic,
reading attentively is not the end of the work but only the beginning, and much of
what we read gets us nowhere, or nowhere visible. When we don’t simply wrest the
meaning we want from texts but rather open ourselves to their complexity and really
read them, we find ourselves in the position of the student, grappling with something
other than and larger than ourselves, unsure what to make of it or do with it. The more
comfortable we are in our expertise, in our explanations and critiques, the easier it is to
forget what this kind of learning feels like, the disorientation it entails, the risk to our
sense of ourselves as knowers. The philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce’s famous “first
rule of reason” is “that in order to learn you must desire to learn, and in so desiring not
be satisfied with what you already incline to think” (48). Obvious as this sounds, it can
be  difficult  to  remember  in  a  culture  structured  to  reward  fully-achieved  and
demonstrated knowledge,  that  even in  its  language  (“field”  “coverage,”  etc.)  treats
knowledge as territory to be conquered.
30 In his essay “Circles,” Emerson describes the solidification of knowledge as a kind of
containment which we must continually overcome: “For it is the inert effort of each
thought, having formed itself into a circular wave of circumstance, as for instance an
empire, rules of an art, a local usage, a religious rite, to heap itself on that ridge and to
solidify and hem in the life” (402).  To expand beyond this boundary is the work of
learning, or, as Simone Weil puts it, the work of attention.
31 In adopting the stance of the detached critic, we are forced either to distance ourselves
from our own most intense reading experiences, or to hide these experiences beneath a
layer of detached critical affect. As a result, our readers and our students learn from us
that the optimal way to experience a text is to remain safely outside of it,  to resist
contamination. That this affect is at odds with the modes of attention we continue to
practice and to teach is a contradiction left to the individual student or critic to try to
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resolve  for  herself,  which  she  often  does  by  sacrificing  or  burying  her  own  most
transformative  reading  experiences,  dismissing  them  as  embarrassing,  naïve,
undisciplined, and irrelevant, and teaching herself to master what Eve Sedgwick calls
“the teachable protocols of unveiling,” lest she be taken in again (143).
32 In  contrast  to  the  model  suggested  by  standard  critical  practice,  consider  the
transactional model of reading theorized by Louise Rosenblatt. Though influential in
pedagogical circles, Rosenblatt’s pragmatist theory of reading has had little impact in
literary  studies  beyond  being  considered  a  subset  of  reader-response  theory.7
Rosenblatt herself suggests one possible reason for this relative neglect, noting in her
1969  essay  “Toward  a  Transactional  Theory  of  Reading”  that  critics  such  as  Rene
Welleck and Austin Warren were “afraid that recognition of the importance of a reader
will lead to an irresponsible impressionism” (35)—would lead, that is, to the respectable
and rigorous field of literary criticism to be overtaken by whimsies and crochets.
33 Referring  to  Dewey  and  Bentley’s  theory  of  knowledge  as  “transactional”  (a  near
relative  of  James’s  epistemology of  participation),  Rosenblatt  notes  that  Dewey and
Bentley “offered the term transaction to designate situations in which the elements or
factors are, one might say, aspects of the total situation in an ongoing process. Thus, a
known assumes  a  knower and  vice-versa.  A  ‘knowing’  is  the  transaction  between  a
particular individual and a particular environment” (35). Describing the application of
this formulation to the act of reading, Rosenblatt writes,
A person becomes a reader by virtue of his activity in relation to a text, which he
organizes as a set  of  verbal  symbols.  A physical  text,  a  set of  marks on a page,
becomes the text of a poem or of a scientific formula by virtue of its relationship to
a reader who thus interprets it. The transaction is perhaps similar to the electric
circuit set up between a negative and positive pole, each of which is inert without
the other. (43–44)
34 This emphasis on a scene of mutually constitutive rather than merely interacting parts
is  a  staple  of  contemporary  theoretical  discourse:  one  thinks  especially  of  new
materialist descriptions of entanglement or “intra-activity” in the work of Karen Barad,
for example.8 But Rosenblatt’s early evocation of a similar epistemology applied not to
the  field  of  science  studies  but  to  the  field  of  reading—already  associated  with  the
feminized labor of teaching—gained little theoretical traction. And indeed, Rosenblatt’s
articulation of the transactional theory in a 1969 article ends with something like a call
to reframe questions about the meanings of texts as questions about care:
Does not the transactional point of view suggest that we should pay more attention
to the experiential framework of any reading transaction? Is it not extraordinary
that major social upheavals seem to have been required to disclose the fact that
schools have attempted to teach reading without looking at the language and life
experience, the cognitive habits, that the child brought to the text?…. Should not a
similar concern for reading as an event in a particular cultural and life situation be
recognized as pertinent to all reading? (46)
35 One advantage I see in a shift in the direction of interested participation as a mode for
literary studies is that it might allow us to begin to let go of the compensatory language
of  discipline  and  rigor  and  picture  ourselves  more  accurately  as  what  we  are:
participants in a profession that is at its most basic level relational and responsive, and
that  has  more  in  common  with  repair  and  caretaking  than  it  does  with  military
training. Though we have long wanted to disguise this aspect of our work, it has always
been there: in our teaching, in our writing, in our intimate work with and relationships
to literary texts as well in on our relations to one another. Some have suggested that
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the post-critical  or “eudaemonic turn” in literary studies represents a retreat  from
social and political commitments of critique. I want to argue that a participatory ethos
is  valuable  precisely  because it  may enable  us  to  shift  literary critical  culture,  and
perhaps even academic culture more broadly, in the direction of care, and that this
shift is both politically significant and, given the increasingly crisis-riven nature of our
individual and collective lives, transparently necessary.
36 In his now-standard letter to incoming undergraduate students that made headlines
when it  was  first  circulated  in  2016,  University  of  Chicago  Dean  John  (Jay)  Ellison
writes, “Our commitment to academic freedom means that we do not support so-called
trigger warnings… and we do not condone the creation of intellectual safe spaces where
individuals can retreat from ideas and perspectives at odds with their own” (Ellison).
After its initial; circulation, the university’s president, Robert Zimmer, reinforced the
message in an essay for the Wall Street Journal. “Universities,” Zimmer wrote, “cannot be
viewed as a sanctuary for comfort but rather as a crucible [sic] for confronting ideas
and  thereby  learning  to  make  informed  judgments  in  complex  environments.”
Whatever  one’s  position  on  trigger  warnings  and  safe  spaces  (which  the  letter
incorrectly  describes),  the  tone  here  is  striking:  real  intellectual  work  involves
“confrontation” and takes place in a “crucible.” These are defined in explicit contrast
to safety and comfort, which are not just dismissed as values but actually disallowed as
terms to be associated with the serious business of universities. A crucible is an apt
figure  for  the  sort  of  atmosphere  Zimmer  seeks  to  evoke:  an  anti-sanctuary,
figuratively a severe trial and literally container in which metals are liquefied by means
of extreme heat. Welcome to college! 
37 In Truth and Method, Hans-Georg Gadamer describes interpretation “not as a form of
domination but of service” (322). In a culture in which possession and domination are
increasingly  recognized  and  rewarded,  it  is  perhaps  not  surprising  that  literary
criticism has sought to mask its natural alignment with service, care, and relation. But
a reframing  of  reading  as  essentially  relational  and  participatory  and  a  concomitant
redescription of  critical  work as  essentially  a  form of  care offers  a  useful  avenue of
resistance, not only to the logic of discipline but to the logic that makes the university a
disciplinary machine. And if not a disciplinary machine, if not a crucible, then what? 
38 Perhaps, following Isabelle Stengers, we might imagine the university as an ecology of
practices, a complex system of relations, not only between people but between ways of
thinking, a system in which no god’s-eye-view exists because we are all on the inside:
An ecology of practices may be an instance of what Gilles Deleuze called ‘thinking
par le milieu’, using the French double meaning of milieu, both the middle and the
surroundings  or  habitat.  ‘Through  the  middle’  would  mean  without  grounding
definitions or an ideal horizon. ‘With the surroundings’ would mean that no theory
gives you the power to disentangle something from its  particular surroundings,
that  is,  to  go  beyond  the  particular  towards  something  we  would  be  able  to
recognise and grasp in spite of particular appearances. (187)
39 To think “through the middle” and “with the surroundings” is to be involved, alert,
interested, a full participant in what James calls “a social scheme of co-operative work
genuinely to be done.” In the university context it might mean to imagine our practices
of teaching and reading and writing not as forms of domination but as forms of service,
to  particular  texts,  writers,  and  readers;  to  particular  students;  to  each  other.  As
Oppen’s  poem,  with  its  continually  shifting  interior  and  exterior  perspectives,
illustrates, literature affords us a heightened capacity to exist in relation. This is what
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Simone  de  Beauvoir  calls  “the  miracle  of  literature,  which  distinguishes  it  from
information: that an other truth becomes mine without ceasing to be other. I renounce
my own ‘I’ in favor of the speaker; and yet I remain myself” (qtd. in Moi 134). Why not
finally recognize out loud what we’ve at least half-known all along, that in the act of
reading—in this space of participation, of complex relationality, of opening and closing
—we are always “shot thru with fragile passages,” and that such delicate permeability
is the basis of what’s best in our work?
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NOTES
1. See especially Latour.
2. See Richardson; Meyer; and Poirier.
3. I am deeply grateful to Nicholas Gaskill for extending to me the opportunity to present initial
reflections  on  this  theme  at  a  conference  on  Pragmatism  and  Early  Twentieth-Century  U.S.
Literature at Rutgers University in March, 2017; and to Steven Mailloux for introducing me, at
the same occasion, to the work of Louise Rosenblatt.
4. For more on Oppen and the pragmatist inheritance, see Spinks.
5. For a lucid and sustained engagement with the similar fear of emotional contagion
reflected in Wimsatt and Beardsly’s “affective fallacy,” see Thrailkill. 
6. Consider, for example, the admiration and attachment reflected in the following description:
“If it were desired to label in three words the most characteristic feature of Mr. Eliot’s technique,
this might be done by calling his poetry a ‘music of ideas.’ The ideas are of all kinds, abstract and
concrete, general and particular, and, like the musician’s phrases, they are arranged, not that
they may tell us something, but that their effects may combine into a coherent whole of feeling
and  attitude,  and  produce  a  peculiar  liberation  of  the  will”  (293).  Far  from  a  limitation  in
Richards’ reading of Eliot, I want to suggest that these feelings are precisely what drive its scope,
intelligence, and lyricism. I include this passage not to indict Richards on failing to practice what
he preaches, but rather to illustrate what Jane Thrailkill identifies as “the extraordinary lengths
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one must  go  to  to  imagine that  the  experience  of  a  literary  work—how it  makes  us  feel—is
irrelevant to its interpretation” (4).




Using as its key texts George Oppen’s 21 Poems and I.A. Richards' introduction to The Principles of
Literary  Criticism, this  essay  argues,  first,  that  in  the  early  decades  of  the  twentieth  century
pragmatist epistemology and ethos of participation had a transformative effect on U.S. poetry,
and  second, that  in  these  same  decades,  the  then-emergent  profession  of  literary  criticism
refused  to  absorb  the  participatory  ethos,  even  as  other  disciplines,  perhaps  most  notably
education and anthropology,  were being transformed by it.  It concludes  with some thoughts
about what the adoption of a participatory approach might look like in literary critical studies,
with  special  attention  to  the  transactional  model  of  reading  theorized  by  Louise  Rosenblatt
beginning in the late 1930s.
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